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Abstract: China-bashing has become a popular media and political sport.  This is 
largely due to the U.S. trade imbalance and the belief, by some, that China is responsible 
for it because it manipulates its currency to hold down the dollar prices of its goods, 
unfairly creating a trade advantage that has contributed to the loss of U.S. businesses 
and jobs.  This paper reviews the problem of the large trade imbalance that the United 
States has with China and its relationship to Chinese exchange rate policy. It examines 
the link between a Chinese renminbi appreciation and the trade balance and also 
whether a generalized dollar decline could solve the global or Chinese U.S. trade 
imbalance. The consensus view explained here is that a renminbi appreciation is not 
likely to fix either the trade imbalance with China or overall. Though these perceived 
benefits of a managed float are small or non-existent, perhaps they should be pursued 
anyway because of small costs or even benefits for China.  Section IV looks at the costs 
of a managed float in terms of the benefits of the earlier peg.  Opponents of a fixed 
dollar/yuan exchange rate ignore the costs of a managed float for China, especially with 
limits on currency convertibility. These costs are outlined here in order to provide an 
economic basis for the earlier fixed rate and China’s reluctance to appreciate. Finally it is 
suggested that the necessary convertibility on capital account, toward which China is 
moving, could easily result in yuan depreciation under a floating rate regime.  This is 
hardly the end that China critics have in mind and it is not one that would improve U.S. 
or other trade imbalances with China.  
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The U.S.-China Currency Dispute: Is a Rise in the Yuan 
Necessary, Inevitable or Desirable?  
 
China-bashing has become a popular media and political sport.  This is largely 
due to the U.S. trade imbalance and the belief, by some, that China is responsible 
for it because it manipulates its currency to hold down the dollar prices of its 
goods, unfairly creating a trade advantage that has contributed to the loss of U.S. 
businesses and jobs.  The attacks reached a new plateau in February 2005 with a 
congressional proposal to impose a 27.5 percent tariff on Chinese goods entering 
the United States unless China immediately “revalues,” or raises the value of its 
currency, the renminbi, whose basic unit is the yuan, by 27.5 percent.  This figure 
is the midpoint of a range of estimates that China undervalues the yuan relative to 
the U.S. dollar by 15 to 40 percent. While this proposal became the centerpiece of 
federal policy efforts to address the Chinese trade imbalance, the proposed 
legislation died with the end of the last Congress. In the meantime, China began 
to push up the value of the yuan in July 2005, but very slowly so that tariff 
proponents and other protectionists have not been satisfied that China has 
removed their unfair competitive advantage.1   
 
This paper reviews the problem of the large trade imbalance that the United States 
has with China and its relationship to Chinese exchange rate policy (Section I). In 
Section II, it examines the link between a Chinese renminbi appreciation and the 
trade balance.  In Section III, it looks at whether a generalized dollar decline 
could solve the global or Chinese-U.S. trade imbalance. The consensus view 
explained here is that a renminbi appreciation is not likely to fix either the trade 
imbalance with China or overall. Though these perceived benefits of a managed 
float are small or non-existent, perhaps they should be pursued anyway because of 
small costs or even benefits for China.  Section IV looks at the costs of a managed 
float in terms of the benefits of the earlier peg.  Opponents of a fixed dollar/yuan 
exchange rate ignore the costs of a managed float for China, especially with limits 
on currency convertibility. These costs are outlined here in order to provide an 
economic basis for the earlier fixed rate and China’s reluctance to appreciate. 
Finally it is suggested that the necessary convertibility on capital account, toward 
which China is moving, could easily result in yuan depreciation under a floating 
                                                 
1 In 2007, the Hunter-Ryan proposal was reintroduced in the U.S. House of Representatives as 
“The China Currency Act of 2007.” This bill would add currency manipulation to the list of 
actionable export subsidies under World Trade Organization (WTO) rules.  However, in Sanford 
(2007), the Congressional Research Service argues that it is not clear that this is consistent with 
WTO rules.  Senators Christopher Dodd and Richard Shelby have introduced another approach in 
the U.S. Senate that would at least define currency manipulation.  It would occur whenever a 
country has both a bilateral and overall current account surplus. No action of any sort is required 
and no evidence on the real or nominal exchange rate would be required.  Another bill that passed 
the Senate Finance Committee revives the approach of Senators Charles Schumer, Max Baucus, 
Chuck Grassley and Lindsey Graham.  It explicitly specifies anti-dumping duties for a failure of 
China to appreciate its currency by a specified amount.  The International Monetary Fund also 
toughened its rules of surveillance for currency manipulation in June 2007, at least partially at the 
urging of the United States to do so.    
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rate regime.  This is hardly the end that China critics have in mind and it is not 
one that would improve U.S. or other trade imbalances with China.    
  
I. The U.S. trade deficit and China 
The U.S. current account deficit, the excess of imports of goods and services or 
unilateral transfers abroad, has climbed steadily and inexorably to record territory 
since 1991, except for slight improvements in 1995 and 2001.  In 1991, the 
current account balance was a small surplus of $2.9 billion, the first surplus since 
1981 and the last.  Since then the deficit has climbed to a preliminary $856.7 
billion, or 6.5 percent of GDP, in 2006.  This is the largest deficit in U.S. history, 
measured both in billions of dollars and as a percent of GDP.  Such a large deficit 
is also unusual in comparison with the experience in other countries, but when 
measured as a percent of GDP, it is not uncommon elsewhere, sometimes 
remaining very large for many years. More often than not, however, such a high 
level of the deficit, especially if unsupported by rapid growth, ends in a financial 
crisis.   
 
The risk of a financial crisis arises because current account deficits must be 
financed.  That is, the excess of imports over exports must be paid for.  When 
foreign credit is extended to a country year in and year out in such large amounts 
relative to GDP, there is eventually concern about the ability of the country to 
repay its foreign credit or even to service its debt to foreigners through interest or 
dividends. If creditworthiness comes into question, creditors become less inclined 
to continue lending and may even begin to reduce it, putting upward pressure on 
interest rates and downward pressure on the currency in the borrowing country.  
There are other reasons for concern about deficits that are more transitory and 
political, but more popular and pressing as well.  In particular, many politicians 
and workers fear that goods and services have been moved abroad and raised 
unemployment.  Businesses that produce exportable goods and services and those 
that compete with imports view weak exports relative to imports as damaging 
competition and sometimes lead efforts to protect the domestic economy.  Thus, 
opposition to current account deficits is easily mobilized, despite the positive 
benefits associated with them.  
  
The connection to China comes from the fact that the U.S. trade imbalance with 
China is its largest bilateral imbalance. In 2006, the current account deficit with 
China was $261.7 billion, or 30.5 percent of the total.  To some analysts, this 
suggests large shifts of business and employment to China and makes China the 
bull’s eye for U.S. protectionists, especially for calls to push China to raise the 
foreign prices of its goods by dramatically boosting the value of its currency. This 
movement has been reinforced by support of advocates of letting markets 
determine the nominal exchange rate through a flexible exchange rate system.     
 
Chinese authorities did begin to push up the value of its currency, the renminbi, 
whose basic unit is the yuan, against the dollar in June 2005, after being 
essentially fixed since 1994.  But recall that the pressure in Congress was to raise 
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the prices of Chinese goods by 27.5 percent through a tariff if it did not occur 
through a rise in the dollar price of the yuan, or a currency appreciation. This is an 
indication of how much some people think that Chinese goods and services are 
underpriced when sold in the United States.  Yet the rise in the dollar price of the 
yuan has been only 6.8 percent from July 2005 until February 2007.  It rose 3.4 
percent in the first year and has risen slightly faster in the past year, up 3.9 percent 
in the year ending in February 2007. This is hardly a breakneck response to U.S. 
pressures. Moreover, while the appreciation has quickened recently, so has U.S. 
inflation so that the dollar prices of Chinese goods are not rising much faster than 
dollar prices of U.S. goods.  Thus, there has been little gain in the pricing 
competitiveness of U.S. goods.  This lack of competitiveness gains highlights the 
importance of what is called the real exchange rate, the observed nominal 
exchange rate adjusted for prices in the two countries.  
 
It is the real exchange rate that affects the price competitiveness of two countries’ 
goods, not the nominal exchange rate. China’s currency could rise in value 
relative to the U.S. dollar, but if China’s yuan prices are rising more slowly than 
the dollar prices of U.S. goods, China’s goods could end up selling at lower prices 
in the United States than U.S. goods do. The real exchange rate is the nominal 
yuan price of the dollar times the relative price level in the United States relative 
to China.  Chart 1 shows the nominal exchange rate for the dollar in terms of yuan 
as well as the real exchange value of the dollar constructed using the U.S. 
consumer price index (CPI) divided by the CPI in China, where each is set equal 
to 100 in 2005. The nominal and real exchange rates are the same in 2005. Note 
that an inverted scale is used to measure the exchange rates so that increases in 
either line reflect an improvement in the respective value of the yuan.  Since the 
exchange rate is the yuan price of the dollar, an increase in the value of the yuan 
(in dollars) means a fall in the value of the dollar (in yuan).  Increases in the 
exchange rate, as shown, are increases in the value of the yuan and reductions in 
the value of the dollar, as desired, but it is the use of the inverted scale that 
accomplishes this.  Like nearly all explanations of exchange rates and their 
movements, the conventional effort to make the discussion as simple as possible 
is unusually complicated.   
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Chart 1 
The Chinese currency has begun to slowly rise  
The yuan rose 2.1 percent, in real terms, from 2003 to 2006
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 If the yuan were undervalued and fixed, as critics claim that it has been, it would 
be expected to appreciate in real terms through faster inflation in China than in the 
United States.  This would occur because an under-valued yuan would accelerate 
China’s export growth and restrict its imports, putting upward pressure on prices, 
wages and rates of return for its exports and its import-competing industries, until 
the cost advantage was eliminated. This would be fostered by the general inflow 
of dollars, which would accumulate at the central bank as reserves and support 
more inflationary growth of the Chinese money supply. The responses to an 
undervalued yuan would lead to a rise in Chinese prices relative to U.S. prices, 
pushing up the real exchange rate for the yuan, given the nominal exchange rate. 
 
This has not occurred to any large degree over the past 13 years. Such a long 
period of adjustment to a peg makes claims of currency manipulation sound 
oxymoronic.  How could a country be said to manipulate its currency when its 
nominal value has not changed for more than ten years?  And how could an unfair 
trading advantage persist for over a decade when prices in the United States 
and/or in China have been free to respond to the demands created by any 
undervaluation, eliminating it in the process?2   
                                                 
2 Two strong proponents of the view that China has manipulated its currency and some of their 
initial commentary supporting institutional responses are Bergsten (2004) and Goldstein (2005). 
Absent moves in nominal exchange rates, neither notes in their numerous criticisms that the long 
decline in China’s real exchange rate followed double-digit inflation and a partially offsetting 
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II. Could yuan appreciation solve the U.S. current account imbalance? 
In order to reduce U.S. demand for Chinese goods and promote Chinese demand 
for U.S. exports, it is the real exchange rate for the yuan that must rise, not the 
nominal rate.  Note that in Chart 1 the real exchange rate began rising in 2003, 
two years before China relaxed the peg of the yuan to the dollar and began to raise 
the nominal value of the yuan.  The real exchange rate for the yuan can rise 
independently of the nominal rate. The real exchange rate has not risen any faster 
since the peg was relaxed than it did over the two years before that action.  On an 
annual average basis, the real exchange value of the yuan rose 1.9 percent in 2004 
and only rose 0.2 percent from 2004 to 2006. 
 
Thus it is not surprising that there has been no improvement in the bilateral trade 
balance with China; the price change that would bring improvement about has 
been weaker since the yuan began to rise than it was before the relaxation of the 
peg. China has implemented an appreciation of its currency, but it has not 
“floated” the yuan, or allowed the marketplace to determine its price. 
International finance specialists refer to the current exchange rate policy regime 
as a “managed float,” because the central bank, the People’s Bank of China, has 
intervened daily to insure that movements in the nominal exchange rate do not 
deviate from the Bank’s desired path, dictated by the government.      
   
Forcing up the value of the renminbi could presumably improve the U.S. trade 
balance with China, but there are other forces that could forestall improvement.  
For example, a rapid nominal appreciation could be offset by Chinese producers 
offsetting the upward pressure on the dollar prices of their goods by reducing their 
yuan export prices.  In effect, they could take reduced profit margins.  Similarly, 
U.S. importers might lower their margins, absorbing part of the rise in the dollar 
cost of the goods they purchase from China in order to maintain prices and sales.  
Of course neither course is sustainable in the long run because reduced margins 
affect the long-term viability of the enterprises.  But it can be a potent offset, 
neutralizing the effects of a foreign currency appreciation. The same forces could 
frustrate adjustment for U.S. exports to China.  Chinese importers of U.S. goods 
could refuse to pass along the price cuts that yuan appreciation would allow, 
taking the lower yuan prices of U.S. goods as increased profit rather than passing 
along those savings to their customers and selling more U.S. exports in China. 
U.S. exporters could also attempt to capture some of the price cut that a higher 
valued yuan would allow by raising dollar prices of their exports without 
disrupting sales.  Again, these are not sustainable actions in the long run, but the 
short run could, in these cases, be measured in years instead of months.  Ignoring 
these adjustments, a large enough rise in the nominal and real value of the yuan 
could reduce the bilateral trade balance with China.  
 
                                                                                                                                     
currency depreciation that created a 24.5 percent appreciation of the currency in 1994-96 (see 
Chart 1). About 60 percent of this renminbi overvaluation was eroded away by subsequent U.S. 
inflation that was faster, on average, than Chinese inflation.    
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Larger yuan appreciation might improve the balance of trade with China, but it 
would not fix the overall U.S. imbalance. U.S. buyers would switch away from 
the more expensive Chinese goods, but they would switch to the next cheapest 
source of goods that benefit from low wage production, which is not likely to be a 
U.S. supplier.  In fact, this shifting has been occurring without yuan appreciation, 
as increases in wages or other costs in China have fostered shifting of sourcing of 
imports to Vietnam, Indonesia or other countries with lower wages relative to 
productivity. Similarly if U.S. exports to China rise, there will be upward pressure 
on U.S. prices of those goods so that there will be reduced exports elsewhere. 
More importantly, the Chinese policy actions that would support a higher valued 
yuan, essentially deflationary monetary growth, would frustrate the effort to raise 
the real exchange rate by forcing down yuan prices relative to U.S. prices, leaving 
U.S. prices of Chinese goods in line with those in the United States, despite the 
higher yuan.3    
 
III. What about a generalized dollar depreciation? 
Even a more generalized fall in the value of the dollar against our trading partners 
would not be likely to eliminate the U.S. current account deficit or even to reduce 
it much, at least for very large declines ranging up to, say, 30-40 percent or so.  A 
recent study by Bailey and Lawrence (2007) finds that a 20 percent fall in a broad 
measure of the value of the dollar would be sufficient, with other steps, to restore 
balance in trade, although not in the current account balance.  The conventional 
wisdom based on most studies is that a much larger and historically 
unprecedented decline would be necessary to eliminate the current account 
deficit.  The largest sustained decline in the index Bailey and Lawrence refer to 
was in 1985-88 when it fell by 35.7 percent.  While the current account balance 
improved, it was not eliminated until some years later.  The same measure of the 
real exchange rate has fallen almost as much as suggested by Bailey and 
Lawrence and others in recent years; from February 2002 until February 2007, the 
Federal Reserve’s broad measure of the real exchange rate for the U.S. dollar fell 
16.1 percent.  Nonetheless the current account deficit has worsened from 3.8 
percent in the year ending in the first quarter of 2002 to 6.5 percent, according to 
preliminary data, in 2006. Of course there are many other factors influencing the 
current account balance and there are lags in the impact of exchange rates on 
trade, but the recent experience is not encouraging. 
 
The more important limitation on the ability of a dollar depreciation to affect the 
U.S. current account balance is the source of the imbalance.  Current account 
imbalances for a country are reflected in imbalances in the financial account.  
Thus if a country imports more goods and services than it exports, it has a 
matching financing flow from the rest of the world to pay for its excess of 
imports.  The central issue is, which causes which?  Does a country run a deficit 
in its current account because it is able to borrow excessively abroad to pay for 
the excess imports, or does it run a current account imbalance because the rest of 
the world is trying to acquire more assets in the United States than the United 
                                                 
3 McKinnon (2005) makes this point in a broader review of problems with yuan appreciation.   
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States seeks to acquire abroad?  The conventional U.S. imbalance story 
emphasizes the former, that the U.S. borrows abroad to finance its excessive 
imports.  But the other possibility is that foreigners want to acquire U.S. assets, 
flooding the country with foreign currency that is used to buy imports of goods 
and services that are more attractive than foreign assets.  The difference in these 
two extreme conceptual scenarios is that the dollar falls in the former case, when 
foreigners must be induced to hold dollar assets, and rises in the second case, 
when the foreigners are trying to induce U.S. residents to acquire their assets, 
goods or services in return for U.S. assets.  The strength of the dollar over the 
period of the climbing current account deficit, despite a decline since 2002, 
suggests that it not excessive U.S. consumption that is driving the current account 
deficit, but the excessive demand of foreigners for U.S. assets that has powered 
the current account deficit to historic levels.   
 
The principal solution to current account imbalances will come from market 
adjustments unless policymakers here or abroad intervene to force an adjustment.  
Capital inflows to the United States will eventually slow or decline as rates of 
return abroad become more attractive relative to the United States.  The 
corresponding excess of imports of goods and services will adjust in tandem.  
Policies that make the United States a less attractive market for investment or 
make foreign countries more attractive can reinforce that adjustment.  Whether 
this will involve movements in the exchange rate for the dollar will depend on its 
current over- or undervaluation and on the effects of policy actions on the value of 
the dollar in the short to medium term.  
 
IV. The costs of the managed float 
Yuan appreciation in nominal terms is not necessary to achieve U.S. policy 
interests and it could damage Chinese development, which is not in the 
geopolitical or economic interest of the United States.  If the yuan were 
undervalued and fixed, it would be expected to appreciate in real terms through 
faster inflation in China than in the United States.  This would occur because an 
undervalued yuan would accelerate China’s export growth and restrict its imports, 
putting upward pressure on prices, wages and rates of return for its export sector 
and its import competing industries, until the cost advantage was eliminated.  This 
would be fostered by the general inflow of dollars, which accumulate at the 
central bank of reserves and support more inflationary growth of the Chinese 
money supply.  China has resisted, to some extent, this inflationary money growth 
by administrative restrictions on interest rates, credit and through reserve 
requirement increases.  Nevertheless, the response to an undervalued yuan would 
lead to a rise in Chinese prices relative to U.S. prices, pushing up the real 
exchange rate, given the nominal exchange rate.  
 
The cost of an appreciation of the yuan is best understood by looking at the 
benefit of a peg.  China had a history of bouts of very rapid inflation during the 
early years of reform and rapid growth (Chart 2).  Until 1994, occasional 
mismanagement of monetary policy led to periods of rapid inflation and currency 
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depreciation. Inflation and currency depreciation threatened foreign investors and 
the domestic public alike, reducing investment and growth. In order to restore 
price stability by providing an anchor for prices and expectations, China pegged 
the yuan’s value to the dollar in 1994.  This had the intended effect of restoring 
monetary stability and essentially eliminating inflation for more than a decade. 
This, in turn, created a very favorable investment climate. Relaxing the discipline 
of a sustainable fixed exchange rate regime risks freeing the central bank to 
unintentionally bring back excessive money creation and inflation. This would not 
only endanger strong investment and growth, it would also create the tensions that 
earlier led to popular unrest, including the Tiananmen Square crisis in 1989. 
 
Chart 2 
Exchange rate stability reduced inflation 
Pegging the exchange rate after 1993 ended earlier bouts of double-digit inflation
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Eventually China’s recent efforts to strengthen its financial markets will begin to 
pay off, allowing for liberalization of its international financial arrangements and 
a freely functioning foreign exchange market.  Until then, the discipline of a 
currency peg and its demonstration effects for foreign and domestic investors 
alike would be valuable and a key safeguard for policy.  The risk of a policy error 
is heightened by abandoning the peg too early.  Relaxing the peg too much, or 
forcing a managed appreciation too rapidly, will lead to unsustainable capital 
inflows as speculators bet on the appreciation of the currency, creating 
unsustainable growth of money, real output and employment and inflation.  This 
would be a replay of the appreciation pressures that led to the eventual breakdown 
of other Asian pegs and crisis in 1997. China has kept itself isolated from many of 
the extreme possibilities seen during that earlier era in Asia, but it would not be 
immune if investors believed that continuing appreciation is possible.       
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The irony of the managed appreciation of the yuan is not just the risk to China’s 
rapid and stable growth, but it also arises from the fact that a competitive and 
accessible capital market would mean allowing larger and free outflows from 
China.  Capital outflows are currently highly restricted and small.  Despite 
China’s rapid growth and scarce capital, private investors in China have limited 
access to high-yield financial assets.  Bank deposits are the principal asset 
available and they have very low, regulated yields. Individuals push an unusually 
large flow of saving through these low-yield accounts, largely because they do not 
have competitive local markets or access to foreign capital markets where they 
can find higher and yet safer rates of return. As China relaxes access to external 
assets, such as foreign bank accounts, mutual funds, or foreign stocks or bonds, it 
will force higher banking standards on domestic firms and find that citizens are 
able to diversify their assets and increase both the returns and safety of their asset 
holdings.  A large capital outflow would put strong downward pressure on the 
yuan, however. Thus, opening of the capital market to substantially boost the 
welfare of domestic households and the competitiveness of the domestic financial 
services industry has now become hostage to U.S. political pressures to 
manipulate the currency in the opposite direction.4   
 
V. What is the “right” yuan-dollar exchange rate? 
Proponents of the view that the yuan is undervalued point to the large and 
persistent bilateral trade deficit that the United States has with China. There is no 
reason why any one country’s trade with another has to balance, however. 
Economic theory and accounting only dictate that, in the long run, a country’s 
overall current account balance with all countries will tend to balance.  And even 
then, the “long run” for this purpose is often counted in decades. A bilateral trade 
balance is not evidence of an imbalance, at least in the sense that there are 
economic forces that would eventually eliminate it, or in the sense that it will ever 
have to go away or that its persistence implies excess costs or risks to either 
country.   
 
International financial theory predicts that the real exchange rate of a currency is 
“stationary,” which means that it fluctuates around its mean, with no tendency to 
drift off and a systematic tendency to move back to the mean if for some reason it 
is moved away from it. This occurs because of “purchasing power parity” (PPP), 
which holds that the same bundle of goods and services will tend to sell for the 
same price (in a given currency).  As a result, the exchange rates must adjust to 
reflect price differences in the domestic price levels in the two countries, or, given 
                                                 
4 China surprised markets when it announced in late August 2007 a large opening of capital 
markets by allowing private citizens open access to investment in the Hong Kong equity market. 
This produced a sharp surge of 2.9 percent, similar to the 2.5 percent rise after mid May 2007 
announcement of the intention to relax rules for individual investors.  Some analysts expect a 
cumulative outflow with full liberalization that would exceed current reserve holdings, if China’s 
freed investors diversified their portfolios as much as typical OECD or other Asian countries.       
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a fixed nominal exchange rate, price levels adjust to make PPP hold. PPP rests on 
the ability to profitably arbitrage price differences when it does not hold.   
 
An example of how PPP works might clarify the point.  Suppose, for the sake of 
the argument, that PPP holds but China appreciates the nominal value of the yuan 
by 27.5 percent.  PPP implies that such an appreciation would cause the price 
level in China to fall eventually by 27.5 percent relative to prices in the United 
States. The reason is that the nominal, and initially real, appreciation of the yuan 
by 27.5 percent would lead Chinese goods to rise by 27.5 percent in dollar terms 
and U.S. goods to fall by 27.5 percent in yuan terms.  Thus the Chinese and 
Americans would buy more U.S. goods and fewer Chinese goods, putting upward 
pressure on U.S. prices and downward pressure on Chinese prices.  Since the 
Chinese market is so small relative to the United States, most of the pressure 
would fall on the Chinese market.  The temporary incentive to switch purchases 
from Chinese to U.S. goods would continue until prices in China fell by 27.5 
percent relative to U.S. prices, and then PPP would be restored.   
 
Some price differences across countries could arise from taxes, transport cost or 
natural endowments of specialized resources. These differences in prices cannot 
be easily eliminated by arbitrage, so PPP may not as readily hold in these cases. 
Even when there are such factors, however, the real exchange rate is expected to 
be stationary in the long run so long as these distorting factors remain unchanged 
or change in a non-systematic way.  But again, the long run can be very long. 
 
The real value of the yuan shown in Chart 1 appears to have a downward drift in 
the value of the yuan, or upward drift in the value of the dollar until 1991. This 
should not be surprising, however.  The chart begins soon after reform and 
opening of the Chinese market began. Highly-centralized socialist economies 
attempt to control prices and hold the prices of essential consumer goods and 
services at artificially low levels and to control access in order to ration them.  
They also control exchange rates and access to foreign exchange. In China’s case 
it appears that the real exchange rate may have been set artificially high so that 
foreign demand was relatively low and domestic demand for foreign goods and 
foreign exchange (dollars) were rationed.  As the economy opened, the real 
exchange rate fell. It might seem that it could take a long time for the real 
exchange rate to become stationary. Some simple statistical tests of the absence of 
stationarity strongly reject this, however. These so-called “augmented Dickey-
Fuller tests” show that there is no significant trend and a “unit root,” the absence 
of stationarity, can be strongly rejected at conventional significance levels. 
Depending on the period used (from 1980 or from 1991), it would appear that the 
real exchange rate has been slightly overvalued, but by no more than 1 percent in 
2006.  Of course, it is not possible to have much confidence in such a conclusion 
based on only 25 years data for an economy in such dramatic transition, but the 
results are surprising, powerful and suggestive. A more detailed analysis by 
Cheung, Chinn, and Fujil (2007) provides stronger support for this conclusion, 
however.       
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VI. Conclusion 
U.S. policy toward China has been to exert strong pressure to get the Chinese to 
appreciate the yuan as part of its opening up of its foreign exchange and other 
financial markets to international competition. The focus is on the latter opening, 
but the expectation is that the currency would appreciate as many other 
policymakers and industry leaders hope. With a flexible, market-driven exchange 
rate, market participants determine the right price for a currency in real time, 
minute-by-minute, so that it is difficult to argue that the exchange rate is ‘wrong.” 
Under a fixed exchange rate, such as that maintained for over 10 years by the 
Chinese, market pressures arising from under- or overpriced currencies do not 
move the exchange rate, but instead move prices in each country to eliminate any 
under- or overvaluation. Price rigidities suggest that this process could be much 
slower than exchange rate changes. In any event, theory and evidence today favor 
the notion that PPP and real exchange rate stationarity are the long-run 
determinates of the exchange rate and of international pricing relationships. The 
evidence suggests that, either way, the yuan may be very close to correctly valued 
for the long term.  Opening the capital markets further could put strong downward 
pressure on the renminbi, creating further turmoil among trading partners.  Any 
effort to force more nominal exchange rate appreciation could be deflationary for 
China, damage U.S. exports and the bilateral trade balance, and it would fail to 
have any effect on the overall U.S. balance.  The value of a symbolic 
appeasement of short-term protectionist interests unfortunately could have greater 
value than avoiding such risks.  
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